
Euromaidan Press is publishing an article by a famous Polish political researcher, Executive Director of the Polish-Ukrainian Foundation PAUCI Jan Piekło. The article is interesting as an example of a full analysis of relations between Ukraine and Europe. But no less important is the fact that Mr. Piekło has been appointed as the new ambassador of Poland to Ukraine and is expected to start his work in autumn 2016.
Mr. Piekło is one of the initiators of the report on Russian war crimes in Donbas that has been handed to the International Criminal Court in Hague. As a journalist, Jan Piekło reported on the Romanian revolution of 1989 and the war in former Yugoslavia. He is an author of two books about the Balkans.
This article is an abridged version of a piece that had originally been published by the Heinrich Boell Foundation.
It was a time when a wave of enthusiasm swept through the world and expectations were extremely high.
Andrew Wilson, a well-known British expert and author of numerous books on Ukraine and the region (‘The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation’) impressed the international public and presented Ukrainians as an important and proud people, which deserved to be treated by the democratic West as a valuable partner. However, soon frustrated and tired of the constant political in-fights within the ruling Orange camp, Ukrainians decided to change sides and gave the political mandate to Viktor Yanukovych’s Blue camp. Although the potential of the Orange Revolution wasn’t fully exploited, its legacy remained. The old EU Member States’ objection against Ukraine’s membership eliminated the use of the ‘carrot’ which had worked so well and speeded up transformation in the central European countries. The various internal reasons in Ukraine: the lack of consensus between the main political factions, corruption, stagnation and suspension of the necessary reforms resulted in the emergence of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ in the West.Although the potential of the Orange Revolution wasn’t fully exploited, its legacy remained.
A symmetrical syndrome of ‘EU fatigue’ developed in Ukraine, deepening the frustration and giving munition to the supporters of the so-called ‘pragmatic’ approach of the Party of Regions.
The real full-scale crisis came soon with the Russian annexation of Crimea, the hybrid war and the military invasion of eastern Ukraine. This situation created a deadlock in which it was impossible to solve the most serious crisis on the European continent since the Balkan War.
Disappointments in blue and orange


With growing concern, we soon had to watch the process of the reversal of democracy in Ukraine.
The country began moving into a ‘soft authoritarian’ model of governance.
But Yushchenko didn’t manage to combat corruption and reform the country, so the process that started with the Orange Revolution was not completed.
Yushchenko paid the price for being a democratic president confronted with challenges he simply couldn’t conquer.
Eastern Partnership, the Polish factor, and Russia
The Eastern Partnership (EaP) – a new Polish-Swedish initiative was announced on 23 May 2008. The Polish diplomacy secured the support of Sweden for proposing to Brussels a kind of ‘eastern upgrade of ENP’. Ukraine welcomed this new initiative, finding it more convincing and attractive.For Poland, Ukraine is a strategic partner in Eastern Europe. Success of democracy in neighboring Ukraine means stability and secure borders for Warsaw.
Russia’s view on Ukraine differs from the Polish: it sees Ukraine as its ‘nearest neighborhood’, an imminent part of the Russian civilization which should be returned to the motherland.
Since the moment of Ukrainian independence, Moscow tried to regain its influence over the former Soviet republic by using different means. But the Orange Revolution and then Maidan Revolution/Revolution of Dignity both ended with a spectacular failure of Russian diplomacy. Benefiting from the economic boom and high energy prices, Russia claimed to become an equal partner of the United States very soon. The EU was not even considered to be a serious competitor for Russia. The Kremlin knew well how to play the game of splitting European unity. Pro-Kremlin experts promoted a vision of Moscow and St Petersburg quickly becoming the new financial centres of the world, and proposed a big free trade zone stretching ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. In order to captivate Western minds, Russia used various instruments: energy/economy, frozen conflicts, propaganda, hybrid technologies, bribes and corruption. For Russia, losing Ukraine was an overwhelming trauma – Kyivan Rus has always been a spiritual center of the Russian Orthodox tradition. Moscow without Kyiv is an organism without spiritual meaning: its soul remained in the onion shaped golden copulas of churches on the hilly bank of the Dnieper, the same churches that the Soviet regime had tried to brutally destroy. This proves that history likes paradoxes. The former KGB colonel, later President, Vladimir Putin pretends to believe in the same God as the Russian tsars …For Russia, losing Ukraine was an overwhelming trauma
Russia is a challenging subject for EU Institutions and Member States, because in fact there is no such a thing as a common European eastern policy. The key EU countries are often driven by wishful thinking or a ‘Russia first’ business policy (like for example the Nord Stream 2 lobby in Germany). Russian propaganda even succeeded in influencing the thoughts of many people in the European Union.Moscow without Kyiv is an organism without spiritual meaning
The Russian annexation of Crimea and the Russian aggression in eastern Ukraine have shown that the EU does not have a policy which can successfully oppose the neo-imperialistic ambitions of the Kremlin.
Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia, three Eastern Partnership countries which decided to sign Association Agreements with the EU are now left without any form of security and political guarantees. Ukraine was even deprived of the territorial integrity assurance included in the Budapest Memorandum.
- Assistance and support for the implementation of AA, DCFTA and reforms in Ukraine 2. Helping to strengthen democracy and rule of law in Ukraine (with a special focus on combating corruption) 3. Include a perspective of EU and NATO membership in the dialogue with Kyiv. 4. Providing training, intelligence and military equipment, which could help Ukraine to protect its sovereignty and limit the death toll among civilians and combat soldiers. 5. Working on a new format of a peaceful solution for the Ukraine-Russia conflict, which will include the issue of Crimea. 6. Helping to elaborate a strategic solution for dealing with the IDPs/refugee crisis in Ukraine. 7. Support for generating growth of the SME sector and increase of foreign investment in Ukraine. 8. Stimulating Ukrainian involvement in a wider regional cooperation within the framework of EaP. 9. Engaging Ukraine (and the EaP countries which signed AA agreements with the EU) in a deeper cooperation on various levels with the EU partners.